Recently biometric authentication systems have become open and large scale thus leading to its widespread use. However, no systematic study has been done with regards to the safety of such systems. On the other hand, cancelable biometrics, the intentional distortion of biometric characteristics to protect sensitive data in biometric authentication systems, has been widely studied. Many methods have been proposed for cancelable biometrics technology, but the security criterion in such is indefinite. In this paper, we consider cancelable biometric techniques from the perspective of the safety of the system. We also verify the effect of the security precaution of the liveness detection techniques using Fault Tree Analysis, a risk evaluation method about data protection and spoofing prevention techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication systems store biometric information as template data, to which identification data from a user are compared with. Templates contain biometric information that is used for authentication. The need for template sharing has been recognized because using the same template between applications makes inheriting trust among organizations (e.g., passports and back cards) possible. Furthermore, it enhances stability and reduces the cost of system development and operation.
Template protection technologies aim at preventing the prediction of raw biometric data from templates and preventing the reuse of leaked templates by unauthorized users (canceling leaked templates and reissuing new valid templates).
When template data leaks, spoofing of other users and leaking of private data may occur. These problems are typically addressed by security technologies such as cryptography, tamper-proof devices like smart cards, and cancelable biometrics. Cancelable biometrics [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , the systematic distortion of biometric information, is one of the techniques used to protect sensitive data. Many techniques for cancelable biometrics have been published but, there has been no systematic study on the security criteria for biometric authentication systems.
Paul et al. proposed to tackle the problem and present a novel solution for cancelable biometrics in a multimodal system. They developed a new cancelable biometric template generation algorithm using random projection and transformation-based feature extraction and selection. The performance of their proposed algorithm was validated on a multimodal face and ear database [8] . They also presented a novel architecture for template generation in the context of situation awareness system in real and virtual applications [9] . In addition to their work, Rathgeb presented a comprehensive survey of biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics [10] .
The purpose of this paper is to discuss and evaluate cancelable biometrics techniques from the viewpoint of ensuring the safety of biometric authentication systems.
Recently, security problems have become an issue thus a variety of measures involving security measures have to be taken. Biometric authentication measures have become the main security service as they are able to give a sense of security to the user. Nevertheless, such measures do not prioritize convenience of the user as its main purpose is to enforce the safety of the system. Biometric authentication may be able to give a user a sense of security but its actually accuracy is not known. In designing security services, the extent of security that can be provided must also be considered. This paper aims to serve as a reference to the actual security service of cancelable biometrics.
The methodology is as follows. First, we explore the locations and types of threats generated by biometric authentication systems. Second, we describe the meaning of cancelable biometrics as a countermeasure technology to security threats. Third, we propose a scheme for evaluating the effectiveness of cancelable biometrics. Next, we verify the effectiveness of the security precaution with the liveness detection techniques by using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). FTA is a quantitative risk analysis and is the evaluation approach about the data protection and the proofing prevention technology [11, 12] . After that, we present the superiority of the liveness detection technique. Finally, we summarize our evaluation result, especially from technical and security points of view, to know the open problems with the current template protection technologies.
THREAT MODEL FOR A BIOMETRIC AUTHEN-TICATION SYSTEM
Many biometric data such as faces and fingerprints are inherently exposed. Nevertheless, it has little value without linking information to the person, and it is a countermeasure preventing a leak. Liveness detection should be done at sensors and since it has no alternative technologies to it. Figure 1 shows the processing diagram of a biometric authentication system. In the enrollment process, raw biometric data of an individual is captured from the user first. After pre-processing, features are extracted from the raw biometric data of individuals. This feature extraction also involves correction processing. After this, the extracted characteristics of an individual are stored in the database as template data.
It is important to note that for every input, biometric data may vary due to the changing condition of the body and the environment. For example, a finger may be rough or smooth depending on a person's activities or a voice can change hoarseness if the person has a cold. As for photos, the quality of the camera or the lighting of the environment can affect the image taken. A fingerprint sensor might also be affected by dryness or humidity.
In the authentication process, biometric data of a user is once captured from a sensor device. Using this identification data, a corresponding template data is selected from the database. Two sets of features are matched then the degree of similarity is obtained by the matching process. If the degree of similarity exceeds a specific threshold, the authentication succeeds and the user can gain access to the application.
This processing model, however, may experience various attacks. In Figure 1 , the numbers shows points of attacks in a biometric information system. We explain the threats as follows.
( (6) Re-input of stored biometric data: Biometric data that remain on sensor devices may be automatically inputted again without the user's input. This is called replay attack. A malicious user can get use the previously inputted biometric data of a legitimate user, such as an old fingerprint or voice as a proof of identity to gain access to the system. (7) Attack on the transfer from template data storage to matching processing: When template data is selected from the database for matching with an identification data, the template data may be illegally changed in the communication channel. (8) Replacement of threshold value: The judgment policy may be illegally modified and the threshold value for the degree of similarity may be set to a new value to get the intended result. (9) Attack on matching process: The matching process may be attacked, and the matching result may be replaced with an arbitrary score. (10) Substituting of final decision data: The judgment result of the authentication may be substituted. Even if pattern recognition systems perform well, if it is possible to alter results, the purpose of authentication systems is defeated. In Table 1 , we present countermeasures to prevent the attacks mentioned above.
We can see that threats in (4), (5) , and (7) are related to the theft of template data and threats in (1) and (6) relate to counterfeit use or spoofing when biometric data is captured and attested. We also note that development of countermeasures for the following attacks will be important in the future.
• Creating a counterfeit fingerprint using cheap material such as gelatin, which can be produced in a short time.
• A method of the transformation of biometric data of protection and each application of biometric data by the encryption for the template protection and storing.
• A peculiar attack that counters dictionary attack to the biometric authentication. There is another problem in the copying process when the data used for biometric authentication loses reliability. When reliability is lost, authentication methods such as using a key, token or password, etc., can nullify attestation devices as many times as possible. However, there is a limit in the number of time of nullification for biometrics.
For the security of biometric information systems, cancelable biometrics, the intentional and systematic distortion of biometric data to protect sensitive userspecific data, is employed.
The problem of template data leakage may be divided into a privacy problem and the problem of spoofing due to reuse. If biometric data is originally exposed and has 1:1 matching and has a link to other information, the individual can be specified. Therefore, it can be argued that biometrics does not employ privacy. As for the problem of reuse, if biometric data can specify the individual using the link information, countermeasure techniques for reuse such as liveness detection technique is more effective than the encryption and nullification of data. In Chapter 4, we will discuss the analysis of the effectiveness of countermeasure techniques.
SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE CANCELABLE BIOMETRICS TECHNIQUE

Cancelable biometrics techniques
Cancelable biometrics is a collective term for template protection techniques used to systematically distort a biometric template to enhance a privacy and security of a biometric authentication system. The concept was proposed by Ratha [6] in 2001. It allows template data to be unique to every application and enables it to be cancelled or revoked when the data is compromised.
There are also two types of nullification methods: encryption-based and image processing-based techniques. The encryption-based approach stores encrypted templates and decrypt these templates at authentication time. There is already a standard encryption-based protocol thus this is advantageous in terms of security and cost. The image processing-based approach matches encrypted templates without decrypting the data. The technical details are discussed thoroughly in [13] . Using this approach, original biometric data is not exposed and allows cancellation of lost template data. It is also a mixed technology of biometrics and encryption as various mechanisms are used to implement these functionalities. Generally, the strength of security is unclear. Figure 2 shows a typical processing flow of cancelable biometrics. In both enrollment and authentication processes, the biometric data is distorted by a one-way transformation function using secret parameters. After the distortion, the generated template data are is stored in a smart card or database.
In this case, the biometric data deviates at each registration. Therefore, when the biometric information is compromised, the old one can be revoked and a new template data can be generated using new distortion parameters.
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) [13] [14] [15] refers to a set of mechanisms, tools, and applications that provide privacy protection to users. PET can be applied to the systemization of cancelable biometrics. Techniques in cancelable biometrics and the dynamic key generation algorithms can be classified into four categories (A to D). This can be seen in Table 2 .
Category A is a method done by non-reversible conversion. In this case, conversion can be applied to both signal (image) and feature regions. Block substitution is an example of a non-reversible conversion. It partitions an image into blocks based on its feature points then scrambles the blocks. It may be non-reversible but the original image may be computed and reverted to. Therefore, security strength is low, and the conversion in the image space is classified into category B.
Category B includes "Image Morphing." Image Morphing is an image processing technique that is used to seamless incorporate images to create a new image. This is done by getting a sequence of images that would represent the change from one image to another when put together with the original image.
Category C is the method to use information on fake data such as Fuzzy Vault. Fuzzy Vault was proposed by Juels and Sudan [3] . It may be described as a form of error-tolerant encryption where keys consist of sets. It uses error-correcting codes as keys to encode information thus making the information difficult to obtain without the key used to encode it.
Category D is a method of data protection using public key cryptography and zero knowledge proof technology. It proposes data protection techniques that use a general cryptographic protocol in ISO TC68 that the technical committee intended for financial services.
Currently, data protection technologies in biometric data are perceived to be immature. Therefore, the cells in Table 2 containing "NA" represent template protection technologies that could be proposed in the future.
Evaluation of validity of the cancelable biometrics
As mentioned earlier, there are two technologies primarily used in the protection of template data: image processing-based methods and cryptography-based methods. Since cryptographic template protection technology is available to the public, its security strength may be evaluated by third parties. For example, the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2 entitled the Security Requirement for Cryptographic Modules, is maintained as a safety standard at the implementation level (Table 3) .
Image processing-based template protection methods are generally preferred over cryptographic-based ones. However, from a technical point of view, image processingbased template protection methods have the following problems. A2. Non-reversible transformation of templates [6] B. Image morphing [6] Common key cryptography NA Public key cryptography D1.
[5], [7] Secret sharing function NA Privacy language NA
• Proper evaluation of the template protection technique is insufficient.
• The third party evaluation cannot be done because the algorithm and the interface are unpublished.
• The security strength evaluation scheme is not established, and objective evaluation concerning a one-way transformation, accuracy preservation and the processing performance is not done (see Table 3 ).
• There is a possibility that it is technically immature as described in paragraph 3.1, and a more effective method will be developed in the future.
• There is no appropriately applied actual case.
• The model that stores individual data in a smart card rather than the database is general from the viewpoint of a restriction of law and safety.
• Cancelable biometrics is a technology that assumes storage in a database, and a powerful application that can demonstrate superiority over template protection technology of cryptography-based methods is not known.
• The priority is low in the viewpoint of the security risk.
Details are presented in Chapter 4. Therefore, it is not enough to ensure that the template data is kept secret, but it is necessary to discuss the safety of the system. As a solution to these problems, security evaluation techniques will be established, and an appropriate application will be developed.
EVALUATION OF COUNTERMEASURE TECH-NIQUES FOR SYSTEM SECURITY
Background
To evaluate the countermeasure techniques for system security, two points should be considered: technical validity and standardization.
We refer to the method of using encryption technology to distort and authenticate the template data as "cipher base" and refer to the method of using image processing as "image processing base."
It is impossible to keep the biometric data completely safe from theft or accidents. When a stolen template data is reused, a biometric authentication system must be able to identify the owner of the template data. Therefore, if we do not focus on the template data, discussing the security of the system is meaningless.
If biometric data have been exposed, the possibility that it will fall into the hands of a malicious user is high. Therefore, to ensure the safety of a biometric authentication system, in addition to measures against theft, measures against reuse must be held of great importance.
There are two ways in which template data may be reused: using counterfeit biometrics and spoofing by hacking the system. As a countermeasure for the first, liveness detection techniques must be implemented while data transfer security techniques must be employed for the latter.
Applying the standard cryptography technology for the data protection in the communication channel is advantageous in terms of cost and safety. Moreover, liveness detection measures should be carried out when body information is acquired from the sensor. In this case, image-processing techniques become indispensable because no alternative technology exists.
Therefore, from a practical viewpoint, it is thought that the development of liveness detection technology has a higher priority than the data protection technique of the image processing based cancelable biometrics.
In the following sections we discuss the liveness detection technique to prevent spoofing in the sensor and prove quantitatively the hypothesis mentioned above. After that, we present the encryption and cancelable biometrics that are used to protect data in the communication channel and the database then we evaluate the effectiveness of each technique with respect to safety.
Risk analysis by FTA
We use Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as the quantitative risk evaluation method. FTA is a top down deductive analysis approach for resolving failure into its causes. It is done by creating a Fault Tree, which is a tree-structured logic diagram that shows the following: the causal relation of the generation process of the threat, probability of the occurrence of the threat based on the diagram, and the evaluation of the risk of the threat.
Manabe et al. also used FTA for evaluating the security levels of cellular phones by a series of experiments using fingerprint authentication, face authentication, and 
Items Description
Hardness of reconstructing original data
Proof of being essentially unable to reconstruct original biometric data from converted data by a one-way function etc.
Preservation of authentication precision
Proof that authentication precision over converted data is no lower than that over pre-converted (original) data.
Performance Demonstration of the performance of a conversion algorithm for practical use.
Application
Existence of an application where image processing-based template protection methods have the precedence over cryptographic-based methods.
voice authentication against criminal penetration [12] . Our study evaluates the overall effect of the security precaution of the liveness detection techniques and compares them to the research of Manabe. FTA involves creating a tree structure logic diagram that shows the causes and effects of the threat process. Using the logic diagram, the origin of the original threat is calculated. To understand the coverage of the FTA, a split type FTA technique has been proposed [11, 16] , whose policy we also carried out in this paper.
The technique first extracts from events a combination of the following information: who (attack actors), when (the time the threat occurs), where (where the threat occurs), and what (the purpose of the attack).
• Who: system administrator, user.
• When: at the time of registration, at the time of operation.
• Where: sensors, feature extraction unit, template database, the matching unit, the transfer unit, authentication result determination section, outside the system. • What: the authentication is successful using a combination of non-registered template with the person of biological information, or to produce a back door for that. From the combination of these 4Ws, the event where the spoofing occurs can be extracted. After that, an FT is created based on the extracted top event, intermediate event, and basic event.
As an example, in Figure 3 (a) of the FT, who refers to the user, when refers to the time of use, and where refers to the template database. In Figure 3 (a) of the FT, who refers to the user, when refers to the time of authentication, and where refers to the authentication result determination section. Incidentally, FT in Figure 3 (b) is defined in the literature reference [17] .
For example, to restore the biological information from the template in Figure 3 (a) , one can obtain the characteristic amount from the template, restore the biometric information from the feature, and enter the forged biometric information to the system where information is prepared in the same manner as in other FT.
Study on the effectiveness of the measures of the
technology When applied to measure security of information systems, we set the threat as the root of the FT [14] then hierarchically unite the events derived based on their causal relation, using add and product logic gates. The probability of occurrence of the root threat can be obtained from the probability of occurrence for each lower even in the FT. Figure 4 is a sample FT about the case of Liveness detection that shows a spoofing attack made based on Figure 2 . We assumed that basic events such as liveness detection, encryption, and cancelable biometrics, were used and provided the probability of occurrence of each event. Based on those probabilities, we calculated the probability of occurrence of the threat [18, 19] . Table 4 shows the probability of occurrence of the basic events used in this analysis. We roughly distinguished that the probability of occurrence obtained an actual figure in three stages (0.1, 0.3, 1.0) because it was difficult to fix it based on a logical basis. The liveness detection technology was assumed to be one (1.0) as it was possible to detect whether or not a body presented is alive. The other probabilities were decided based on a discussion with expert on biometrics.
We presented the papers where this paper is based on and discussed with exporters on conferences and received feedback about this three stages [13, 14] . Other researchers should discuss more the values of the stages but we decide the values for these three stages as specified in Table 4 . If we have a scientifically rigorous approach about the weight, of course, it will be changed and calculated again.
We show the numerical results in Table 5 . The risk type is typically defined by the product of the probability of occurrence and the size of the loss. However, in this case, we assumed that the loss that occurred as a result of spoofing was the same for each threat, thus we only evaluated the risk by the probability of occurrence.
As you see from the Table 5 , the probability of occurrence of threats is 0.33 under the situation where there are no other measures. In addition to this, we were able to lower the probability of occurrence (0.15 and 0.13, respectively) by using cryptography and cancelable biometrics. Also, we can see that the probability of occurrence of threats using liveness detection is 0.
The following conclusions can be derived from above.
• In these technologies, the liveness detection is the most effective.
• From the point of view of reuse prevention, it is a technology to protect data. Data encryption and biometrics at this level is effective.
• The cryptography technology is standardized, and it is an advantage if an objective evaluation approach for safety has been established.
• The template protection technology currently proposed is still immature but it has a great potential to evolve sufficiently in the future.
• Technical merits and demerits cannot be judged objectively because the precision and the security strengths are not estimated adequately.
• There is no comprehensive evaluation of the security.
For example, you cannot specify a particular person using a cancelable information. However, in biometric authentication, anyone who provides a match to the template data is linked to the personal information. Thus, one can still get the personal information.
• Even if biometrics is altered, one can still easily acquire the original physical information from the body, and this can be linked to the person's private information. Cancelable biometrics contribute to availability because a template can be reissued beyond the limit of the biometrics but this is not applied by this evaluation.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered methodologies that address the security and safety of biometric authentication systems. We then systematized cancelable biometrics technique based on Privacy Enhancing Technology and presented in Chapter 4 the possibility of the development of new technology. We also proposed the evaluation items such as one-way transformation, accuracy preservation and processing performance that clarified the effectiveness of the cancelable biometrics. We compared the effectiveness of the technologies by using FTA method for the reuse problem in a biometric authentication system when biometrics data are leaked and exposed. According to the FTA analysis, when compared the cryptography and liveness detection, the effect of cancelable biometrics on the safety of biometric authentication systems was small. Among the security techniques studied, liveness detection is the most effective while encryption and cancelable biometrics have same degree effectiveness for protecting the data reuse. However, encryption technology is standardized its safety has been objectively evaluated. 
